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Democracy as a Way of Life: 
Critical Reflections on a Deweyan Theme
José María Rosales1
AbstrAct
This article aims to critically assess John Dewey’s ideal of “democracy 
as a way of life”, an evocative though elusive moral and political ideal linked 
to both his communal notion of democracy and his reformist view of liberal-
ism. Beyond the school, where citizenship education begins, Dewey claims 
that individuals learn democratic habits when they associate and participate 
in political activities, which are not solely confined to political institutions. 
Exploring Dewey’s democratic theory invites a twofold account. It takes to 
contextualize Dewey’s views in light of the political debates of his time, in 
particular the interwar debates on the crisis of liberalism and democracy. And 
it takes to examine his democratic thought in terms of educational theory and 
policy. Both aspects integrate into the argument.
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Few thinkers have kept an influence on American public life so enduring 
as John Dewey. From his early 1882 philosophical essays to his latest 1952 
philosophy, politics and pedagogy writings amount to seven decades of con-
tinuous publishing. Most interestingly, by cultivating scholarly research and 
publicistic activities Dewey has crossed the frontiers of academic debating 
to become a public intellectual. His extra-professional involvements fairly 
illustrate the itinerary of a moral philosopher turned reformist academic, cur-
rent affairs critic and political activist. As social thinker, he argues a gradualist 
program of liberal reforms, a move that balances the social engineering pro-
pensity of his pedagogical theory.
1 University of Málaga. E-mail: jmrosales@uma.es. This paper is part of the project The 
Civic Constellation (Spanish National Research Plan, FFI2011-23388).
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As a pragmatist philosopher Dewey holds the priority of experience over 
theory, in the edifying sense of the primacy of democracy as civic experimen-
tation.2 Arguably, it happens not only in the political arena but in other social 
domains, namely the school, the workplace and civil associations, where in-
dividuals get involved in political practices and learn democratic habits. They 
serve as civic testing grounds showing that democracy can be a significant 
part of everyday life.
Dewey’s liberalism binds the solidary individualism of the American lib-
eral tradition with the reformist ingredient of the European social-democratic 
thought (Dewey 1930, 77-89; Morán 2009). His is a militant liberalism. As 
president of the People’s Lobby and the League for Independent Political 
Action, Dewey speaks out for an egalitarian liberalism. That precisely ex-
plains his stubborn opposition to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s liberal admin-
istration. The intellectual and political, though not personal, relation between 
Dewey and Roosevelt deserves specific attention. For this paper suffice it to 
underline how systematically Dewey checks the New Deal policies, which he 
deems insufficiently reformist. Already before his first presidency, being still 
New York governor, Roosevelt is the object of a documented and convinc-
ing criticism published in the New York Times (Dewey 1932, 395-6). Dewey 
questions the redistributive character of Roosevelt’s fiscal policies, which, 
according to official data, benefited capital gains over labor incomes.
During Roosevelt’s first two terms, Dewey’s criticisms draw attention to 
the New Deal’s weaknesses. The improvisation of its social programs and 
their incapacity to halt the working classes’ impoverishment or the disre-
gard of public education are frequently denounced.3 Only since the third 
presidency, once the United States enters the war at the end of 1941, Dewey’s 
judgement on Roosevelt’s achievements begins to change. Their former dis-
crepancy in matters of social entitlements is replaced by a common concern 
on the American foreign policy.
enlightening A democrAtic Public
John Dewey’s writings from 1916 to 1939 contain the essentials of his 
democratic theory. Earlier publications, compiled in the critical edition of his 
Collected Works, both in the Early Works from 1882 to 1898 and the Mid-
dle Works from 1899 to 1924, include numerous references to democracy 
and several monographic essays (Westbrook 1991, 117-227), but it is in the 
2 I owe this interpretive play, though using it in a different sense, to Rorty 1991.
3 See the 1933 and 1934 articles published in the People’s Lobby Bulletin, and reprinted 
in J. Dewey, The Later Works: 1925-1953, vol. 9: 1933-1934, ed. J.A. Boydston, A. Sharpe, P. 
Baysinger. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986, 247ff.
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1930s where the main writings appear. An exception is his 1888 essay “The 
Ethics of Democracy”. A thoughtful review of Henry Maine’s 1886 Popular 
Government, it argues that democracy is not only a form of government but, 
rather, a social and ethical notion. “[U]pon its ethical significance”, Dewey 
writes, “is based its significance as governmental” (Dewey 1888, 240). Such 
moral meaning denotes the democratization of individual freedoms, for de-
mocracy differs from aristocracy regarding means, their goal being identical: 
Not an elite but all individuals in democracy are entitled to fully realize their 
freedoms (Dewey 1888, 243-4). Dewey’s initial democratic individualism 
remains a steady feature in his political thought.
In 1916 Democracy and Education is published. A classic of pedagogical 
theory, it develops Dewey’s “democratic conception in education,” whose 
underlying principle is the need of education for a proper enjoyment of 
democratic rights. Dewey holds that education has the reformist capacity to 
transform the social order by revitalizing its associative fabric. Education 
thus creates “a form of social life” characterized by the mutuality of interests 
among its members. He calls it a “democratic community” (Dewey 1916, 92).
“A democracy,” writes Dewey, “is more than a form of government; it 
is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experi-
ence” (Dewey 1916, 93). To become democratic, a society should facilitate 
the “participation in its good of all its members on equal terms” and provide 
“a flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different 
forms of associated life” (Dewey 1916, 105). Democracy rests on an epistem-
ic condition, namely the free circulation of knowledge enabling individuals to 
participate in public affairs (Dewey 1916, 354-5). A democratic community 
is no harmonious compound but a dynamic balance between individual and 
shared interests.
In later writings Dewey develops this idea of Hegelian imprint (Dewey 
1925a, 3-21; Joas 1993, 94-121). The Public and Its Problems, published in 
1927, is the most elaborate argument in his democratic community project. It 
had began as a review essay on Walter Lippmann’s 1925 book The Phantom 
Public (Dewey 1925b, 213-20). With Lippmann he shares a gloomy diagnosis 
on the American public’s apathy, measured by opinion polls, but his response 
turns different. Dewey claims that political apathy is due to the inability indi-
viduals demonstrate to find their political place in society (Dewey 1927, 319). 
The cause thereof is overwhelming. Industrialization had eroded the tradi-
tional forms of life, yet without providing alternative forms of mutuality. The 
American democracy, Dewey contends, had originated in the colonies’ com-
munal forms of life (Dewey 1927, 304-7). Though not certainly so early, they 
had produced practices of local government. Over time, their local character, 
particularly their parochialism, proved an obstacle to further democratization.
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For Dewey, however, they comprise the response to the “eclipse of the 
public”, namely the decay of the American citizenry as a participatory public. 
Its retrieval would contribute to overcoming the “Great Society” stage, 
which has “invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of 
former times without generating a Great Community” (Dewey 1927, 314). 
Unless that happens, there will not be an “articulate Public”. Communication 
could make it possible: “Our Babel”, writes Dewey, “is not of tongues but 
of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible” 
(Dewey 1927, 324). Dewey’s image of community draws on Josiah Royce’s 
idea of a universal community as presented in his 1913 book The Problem 
of Christianity (Kuklick 1985, 211-37). Royce had elaborated the idea of a 
communication community, so fruitful in pragmatism’s reception of German 
post-idealist philosophy. Dewey further develops its political significance by 
reconceptualizing democracy in communitarian terms.
More precisely, democracy “is the idea of community life itself,” not an 
utopian ideal, Dewey claims, but a project realizable in the many forms of 
associative life that even the Great Society cannot frustrate (Dewey 1927, 
328-9). What does Dewey imply by “communal life” to express the meaning 
of democracy? He acknowledges that democracy is “a mode of government” 
but this political meaning would not exhaust its whole significance, rendered 
instead by the “superior claims of democracy as an ethical and social ideal”, 
as claimed earlier (Dewey 1927, 286-7; Rogers 2010). To this effect he has 
in mind the political experience of local communities, which is where de-
mocracy assumedly arises, dreaming of extending their committed sense of 
participation to bigger communities.
The point is whether or not the sense of civic and moral mutuality local 
communities seem to provide remains in bigger political associations. Clearly 
not unless, Dewey contends, democracy is secured from its birth: “Democ-
racy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community” (Dewey 
1927, 368). In so complex a scheme, education bridges the gap separating an 
inarticulate society from a democratic, participatory public. Yet Dewey’s trust 
in education’s transformative power is so strong that he overlooks the difficul-
ties that exist for effecting real changes (Schutz 2001). The social engineering 
elements of his educational and democratic theory need the restraining real-
ism of practical politics.
democrAcy And new liberAlism
The Great Community project occupies Dewey in the following years. 
During the 1930s he publishes new essays on the conditions to carrying the 
democratic ideal into practice. In Liberalism and Social Action, of 1935, he 
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argues that moral and political education make up the enabling condition for 
democracy to work, from local to state or national communities. Along with 
the introduction of universal suffrage and representative government since the 
nineteenth century, education has become a means for extending democracy 
“to all the areas and ways of living” where individuals exercise their freedoms 
(Dewey 1935, 25).
Dewey’s democratic arguments deliver a therapy in moments of crisis. 
Civic apathy, the interwar malaise, was not the only cause of democracy’s 
discredit. Equally important was professional politicians’ irresponsible per-
formance since the rise of fascism in the 1920s and the spread of the world 
economic and financial crisis, with exceptions. Educating political attitudes 
can compensate for poor capacities but it cannot be dealt with on a case per 
case basis. Rather, Dewey’s main interest lies in educational policy. Neces-
sary as revising the curriculum was, the crucial change should come through 
policy measures to turn schools into democratic “agents” to educate individu-
als for an “intelligent participation” in society. “[T]his problem”, he adds, “is 
the one that most demands the serious attention of educators at the present 
time” (Dewey 1937a, 190). Clearly Dewey’s educational project takes inspi-
ration from the liberal traditions. Indeed, from what he considers a “renascent 
liberalism,” whose “first object” is education (Dewey 1935, 44) and whose 
practical approach draws on the experimental method.
Bringing intelligence to politics is an educative endeavor but is the most 
pressing political need of the time. Dewey thinks it is a distinctive feature of 
liberalism, the one that nurtures democracy. In earlier writings he had claimed 
that free communication provided democracy’s epistemic condition. The free 
circulation of knowledge made possible to create an enlightened public. Thus 
Dewey sees democracy as a method, the method of “organized intelligence” 
that transforms the public space into a deliberative arena. Democracy is a 
deliberative form of government inasmuch as it brings to the open the free 
political deliberation on conflicting interests. Through deliberation conflicts 
are discussed “in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by 
either of them separately” (Dewey 1935, 56).4 Nothing is settled in advance 
and so the procedure turns a crucial factor in democratic decision-making and 
government.
Democracy’s method is a reworked version of the experimental method, 
aiming therefore to develop free methodical experimentation. Like scientific 
research, democracy’s performance should be publicly tested. Deliberation 
serves the object of public scrutiny, further extended to the action of the press. 
4 Dewey’s democratic thought has been one of the inspirations in the debates on delibera-
tive democracy. See Festenstein 2004 and Kosnoski 2005.
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A new liberalism, Dewey claims, should hence be deployed as a “concrete 
program of action,” a reformist political plan enabling democracy to operate 
as a “living reality” (Dewey 1935, 64; Ryan 1995, 309-27). The comple-
mentariness of liberalism and democracy was never so apparent than in their 
political reaction to fascism (Dewey 1936, 287). And earlier on, upon their 
lack of reaction. Liberalism had ended in failure when proved unfit to inspire 
a reformist program. That was a crucial cause of democracy’s crisis.
democrAcy’s morAl And PoliticAl ideAl
The crisis, though, affected democracy’s political performance, not its 
ideal. Dewey’s interpretation is trivial but consistent with his notion of de-
mocracy and the treatment aimed to mend it. So given that politics as usual 
fails to deliver democratic outcomes, democracy’s recovery should begin by 
educating “democratic habits of thought and action” (Dewey 1937b, 225). 
The “democratic way of living,” which rests on the “faith in the capacities of 
human nature,” is the product of education (Dewey 1937b, 219-20). Hence, 
even if democracy “has not been adequately realized in any country at any 
time,” it keeps the allure of “radical” ends as it turns into an educative, po-
litical project to transform the associative fabric of society and the system 
of political institutions. To democratize them is the challenge assumed by 
the “method of public intelligence” in the search for public freedom (Dewey 
1937c, 298-9). When in Freedom and Culture Dewey presents his “humanist 
view of democracy”, he is arguing that political institutions by themselves 
do not disclose all of democracy’s meanings. Rather, it is necessary to con-
sider that democracy is also “expressed in the attitudes of human beings and 
is measured by consequences produced in their lives” (Dewey 1939a, 151). 
Democracy’s moral value closely depends on those consequences. That they 
profoundly affect “human potentialities” is but a proof of the “intrinsic moral 
nature of democracy” (Dewey 1939a, 154-5).
It is the mid 1930s and Dewey’s appeal has a patriotic resonance, in partic-
ular when he wonders, in another article, what can be learned “from the anti-
democratic states of Europe,” to respond that the lesson is to take as seriously 
as fascist states take, though for opposite reasons, the political education of 
individuals. For democratic America it entails “that we should take seriously, 
energetically and vigorously the use of democratic schools and democratic 
methods in the schools; that we should educate the young and the youth of 
the country in freedom for participation in a free society” (Dewey 1938, 297). 
Dewey’s democratic theory is a theory of citizenship education. His later writ-
ings abound in details on the link between democracy and education, the faith 
in democracy being a faith in education, which reveal democracy both as a 
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political and moral ideal (Dewey 1939b, 226-7; Fott 2009; Salmerón Castro 
2011). They also contain a trait of self-criticism.
The current political predicament, Dewey observes, is the result of democ-
racy being taken for granted. The situation requires an “inventive effort and 
creative activity” to renovate the democratic experience (Dewey 1939b, 224-5). 
That the United States had endured the world crisis has proved just a temporary 
achievement. An immediate lesson from the war, he will admit a few years 
later, is that a peaceful international order can only rest on democratic grounds, 
namely on a cooperative order of democratic states (Dewey 1944, 252-7). At 
eighty-five Dewey revises his previous view on the apparently regional charac-
ter of World War II. He also keeps some distance from his earlier unverifiable 
trust in democratic means to tackle the war’s challenges (Dewey 1939a, 186-7).
concluding remArKs
This article has discussed John Dewey’s ideal of democracy as a way of 
life. The phrase deserves attention but its symbolic use is limited as it further 
refers to Dewey’s democratic thought. By using the way of life metaphor he’s 
alluding to a different experience of democratic politics: communitarian, en-
lightened, participatory. The metaphor is still used in academic writings and 
conferences but so successful a name renders sufficiently neither Dewey’s 
moral and political thought nor democracy’s institutional significance as a 
form of government.
For all its moving effects, the ideal of a democratic way of life resists 
rational scrutiny, being its value distinctly rhetorical. In response to democ-
racy’s crisis Dewey suggests an imaginative retrieval of its participatory con-
dition. Yet can democracy be more than a form of government? For Dewey 
it is a moral and social ideal inspiring a way of learning and practicing poli-
tics, but the question remains whether or not it can work outside the realm 
of politics without losing its genuine meaning. Democracy is a system of 
government based on its members’ equal political rights. So simple a descrip-
tion may conceal how difficult turns to put it into practice and, moreover, to 
consolidate it. It may also hide the fragility of a democratic order, which more 
than any other form of government relies on civic involvement.
Underneath such appealing image lies the rhetoric of communal life, 
though not as drawn on real past experience. Dewey idealizes the history of 
American democracy by recreating its origins right after colonial rule, thus 
taking the neighborhoods as expansive centres of communal democracy. Yet 
the American public has been a constitutional creation, not a social evolution 
from the colonists communities (Morgan 1988, 263-87). A similar aim pro-
jects onto his idea of transforming the Great Society, i.e. the real society, into 
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a Great Community. Dewey believes the communicative links individuals set 
up in small communities are expandable to a complex society and even to a 
federation of societies.
Interesting as the suggestion is, it needs further qualification (Brunkhorst 
2002; Bray 2009). And some critical review, since his argument underlines 
community’s most friendly side, the one of closeness and affections, while 
disregarding society’s civilizing drive. Whereas community life is identified 
with interpersonal relations, a kind of fellowship of citizens, society is ex-
plained, fairly, in contractual terms. However, no critical mention is made 
of the burdens face-to-face relations in community life impose on individual 
freedoms. The missing self-restraint regarding communal politics contrasts 
with Dewey’s criticism of American nationalism, “one of the strongest factors 
in producing existing totalitarianism”, and, in particular, its “anti-democratic 
heritage of Negro slavery”, which he deems only a stubborn defence of free-
doms can overcome (Dewey 1941, 275-7).
Dewey’s interest in influencing public opinion explains in part his meta-
phoric usage of the concept of democracy. In this case his is not scholarly lan-
guage. He certainly got to inspire a wide-ranging ideal, as Richard Rorty has 
gratefully acknowledged in his Deweyan argument of “social hope” (Rorty 
1999, 234-9), but the use of communal life metaphors falls short of explor-
ing democracy’s real conditions. Dewey assumes that democracy is the ideal 
of community life, which the Great Community aims at, while simultane-
ously community life is presented as democracy’s ideal. If they are competing 
claims that is something not sufficiently spelt out. Furthermore, in either case 
the same inference applies, namely that individual freedoms flourish under 
communal relations, provided they are favorable. The ideal of communal life 
is hardly criticized, though its being preferred does not turn self-evident its 
alleged prescriptive value.
Political changes test democracy’s political ideal, while human freedoms 
test its moral promise. Jefferson is for Dewey a source of authority: “Jeffer-
son’s formulation is moral through and through: in its foundations, its meth-
ods, its ends” (Dewey 1939a, 173), but his trust in rights equality, inscribed 
on the Declaration of Independence, was clearly political. As Gordon Wood 
argued, Jefferson’s appeal to an “egalitarian moral sense” aimed at justify-
ing democratic equality (Wood 1992, 239-40). The new political order estab-
lished after independence granted citizens equal political rights. Interpreting 
Jefferson, Dewey asserts that human rights are democracy’s ends. Indeed they 
are, along with other aims, but the relevant point is that they can only be real-
ized when democracy, its system of institutions, works.
To become a viable political system, democracy relies on the participation 
of citizens. Yet political participation is not democracy’s sole and defining 
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feature. Holding that it is a way of life only portraits figuratively the set of 
political practices democracy creates, but hardly credits democracy with other 
economic, social and legal conditions it needs to function. For it is not possi-
ble to live democratically in the sense presumed by the idea of democracy as a 
way of life, namely as a stable pattern of behaviour. Many aspects of everyday 
life both public and private, even if involving political actions, are not suitable 
for democratic deliberation and decision-making.
Living democratically means practicing politics in a civic sense. The very 
idea of communal life raises the question of inclusion in and exclusion from 
the civic community. Beyond that, the ideal keeps its political anchorage in 
other social realms provided democratic norms, practices and procedures are 
reasonably adapted. Hard to stick to a general rule, the likely wisest option 
would be to check in each case the suitability of democratic uses. So, for 
example, in some school practices teachers and students participate following 
democratic procedures, although that does not turn the school into a wholly 
democratic institution. Or take the workplace, which has become in many 
countries, not the majority, a space for workers to exercise economic, social 
and political rights, though even the most advanced legislation does not aim 
to fully democratize labour relations.
In spite of arguable flaws in his political thought, Dewey is a fertile source 
of democratic thinking (Bernstein 1986, 260-72). Democracy, as he noted, is 
a civic experiment in government, and so an enlightened democracy is the 
visible communal offspring of enlightened citizens. Public education becomes 
then democracy’s facilitating condition. That synthesis conveys Dewey’s 
democratic thought, the achievement of a liberal intellectual committed, in a 
Millian sense, with the role the school plays in civic education; and advocat-
ing, in line with Jefferson, that democracy relies on the active involvement of 
citizens in public affairs.
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